













The bulk of official development assistance (ODA) from Australia is provided to Asia 
and Oceania.  Indonesia and Papua New Guinea together account for nearly a quarter 
of the total.  Physical proximity to Canberra and large receipts of bilateral aid from 
the United States is a significant determinant of who receives this aid.  The level of 
poverty is (statistically) a significant determinant of aid allocated by Canberra only 
after recipients have been chosen.   
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Who receives Australian aid and why? 
1. Introduction 
Interest in answers to questions on  who receives Australian aid and why are 
timely given the announcement by the government of its intentions to double the 
total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget by 2015-16.  The Australian 
government has announced its intention to allocate 0.5 percent of gross national 
income (GNI) by 2015-16 to ODA (AusAIDa, 2011).  This is a sharp turnaround 
given that the ODA budget fell from a high of 0.5 percent of GNI in 1974-5 to 0.25 
percent  by  2000-01.    It  has  since  regained  some  of  the  lost  ground,  having 
reached  0.32  percent  in  the  2008-09  Budget.    On  dollar  terms,  Australia 
budgeted AU$4.3 billion to ODA in 2010-11 (the current financial year), and this 
figure  is  projected  to  double  by  2015-16.    In  per  capita  terms,  the  above 
translates  to  approximately  $200  per  person  being  allocated  to  ODA.    The 
announced increase in ODA is raising concerns on how this will impact on the 
effectiveness  of  Australian  aid,  and  particularly  amongst  the  Pacific  Island 
nations who are perceived as being ‘over-aided’2.  This paper throws light on 
these issues.   
The effectiveness of ODA can only be assessed by aligning the intended outcomes 
of the donor with the resources expended.  On the former, the idealist view that 
“the true test of aid effectiveness is improvement in peoples lives” (Birdsall and 
Kharas 2010).  Corruption, government ineffectiveness, and inefficiencies in the 
public  sector  are  often  cited  as  reasons  for  the  failure  to  achieve  this  goal 
(Alesina and Dollar 2000).  The realists see the motivations for giving aid to 
developing countries as an ongoing tussle between meeting ‘recipient needs’ and 
satisfying ‘donor interest’ (Maizels and Nissanke 1984).  The empirics on the 
allocation  of  bilateral  aid  reveals  that  donor  interest,  and  particularly 
achievement of the donors’ foreign economic, security, and political objectives, 
trump recipient need (McKinley and Little 1979).  More recent analysis confirms 
                                                 
2 For the case against effectiveness of aid. see Boone, P. (1996). "Politics and the effectiveness of 
foreign aid." European Economic Review 40(2): 289-329.  The counter case is made by Hansen, 
H. and F. Tarp (2000). "Aid effectiveness disputed." Journal of International Development 12(3): 
375-398. 2 
 
this findings (Alesina and Dollar 2000).  If the above was true for aid-giving by 
Australia, then assessing the effectiveness of Australian ODA on ‘recipient need’ 
would be a mistake. 
Studies  to  date  have  treated  all  donors  as  having  the  same  motivations  for 
providing  aid  to  developing  countries.    The  evidence  on  the  motivations  for 
providing aid is gleaned from estimates of regression models that give partial 
correlates of aid provided with the espoused reasons for giving aid.  Most models 
lack a theoretical basis and thus have ad-hoc specification.  Missing from these 
models,  moreover,  is  the  role  of  proximity  in  aid  giving.    This  paper  makes 
original contributions to each of the above.  We model the allocation of ODA as 
part of optimising behaviour of donors.  This forms the basis for the model that is 
estimated with data on bilateral aid transfers.  Second, we include proximity as 
an explanatory variable and discover that it is a significant determinant of aid 
provided by Australia and the United States of America.  Third, our focus is on 
the allocation of Australian bilateral aid.  In sharp contrast to earlier studies, the 
level of poverty and the policy environments are not found to  be statistically 
significant determinants of the amount of Australian aid that is received when 
the full population of ODA recipients is considered.  However, when the sample 
is restricted to those who do receive aid from Australia, then poverty is found to 
be significant.  The level of aid given by the United States is significant for the 
amount of aid received from Australia.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a summary of 
Australian  ODA.  Section  3 answers the  question  on  who receives Australian 
bilateral aid.  Section 4 explains why.  Conclusions bring the paper to a close. 
2. Literature review 
Australia has a long history of providing aid.  It started in the early 1940s with 
transfers to its trust territory of Papua New Guinea.  Within the span of the past 
three  decades,  Australia  conducted  two  broad-ranging  reviews  of  its 
development  assistance  where  the  objectives  of  ODA,  its  volume,  and 
effectiveness were considered at length.  The first of these reviews, commonly 3 
 
referred to as the Jackson  Committee  (Australia 1984)  noted that  the aim of 
Australian aid are to achieve humanitarian, strategic, and commercial goals.  The 
Committee recognised that Australian ODA has several mandates and that that 
these  are  balanced  against  each  other  via  the  political  process.    The  next 
(Simons)  Review  (Australia  1997),  aptly  titled  “One  Clear  Objective:  poverty 
reduction  through  sustainable  development”  saw  differently.    The  Simons’ 
Committee  saw  poverty  reduction  pursued  via  sustainable  development  as 
encompassing  Australia’s  foreign  policy  interests;  thus  emphasised  a  single 
objective for Australian aid policy.  Aid solely for poverty reduction has a major 
attraction in that it involves the use of one instrument to target a single goal.  
However, multiple goals and the opaque meaning to them help maintain political 
support within Australia for the aid budget (Warr 1997).  The 2006 review of the 
Australia aid program reiterated the dual objectives of poverty reduction and the 
pursuance of national interest (Australia 2006).   
Bilateral aid has always recognised the foreign policy objectives.  In rhetoric at 
least,  these  have  been  stated  as  secondary  to  the  poverty  reduction  goal.  
Thirteen years on after Simon’s critique of the use of one instrument (ODA) to 
achieve multiple goals espoused by the Jackson  Committee, the Jackson  view 
survives.    The  multifaceted  humanitarian,  strategic,  economic  and  political 
demands placed on bilateral aid are being acknowledged, and emphasis placed 
on the individual components is indeed balanced via the political process both at 
home and abroad.3  The Strategic Framework for Australia’s aid program states 
that: 
“[t]he  objective  of  Australia's  aid  program  is  to  assist  developing  countries 
reduce poverty and achieve  sustainable development, in line with Australia's 
national interest.”  (AusAIDb, 2011) 
What constitutes ‘Australia’s national interest’ remains opaque.  Some light is 
thrown on its possible meaning in the next section.  However, the Australian 
                                                 
3  The  United  States  also  has  similar  multiplicity  of  objectives  including  commercial,  security, 
diplomatic, and development; see Birdsall, N. and H. Kharas (2010). Development Quality of Official 
Development Assistance Assessment, Center for Global Development, Washington DC. 4 
 
Agency for International Development (AusAID) has its program of activities that 
are subdivided into the following (inter-linked) themes: 
(i)  “accelerating economic growth”;  
(ii)  “fostering functioning states”;  
(iii)  “investing in people”; and, 
(iv)  “promoting regional stability and cooperation”. (ibid) 
According to AusAID, the first is to take priority over the next decade.4  The 
second places nation state at the centre in delivering services to its people.  The 
third focuses on improving access to health and education to enable the poor to 
move out of their predicament.  The fourth places the nation state as the key 
participant in addressing trans-boundary issues.  Implicit in  the above is that 
trans-boundary issues take place within the confines of physical space; thus the 
role for regionalism.  We test for empirical support to the above -mentioned 
factors in the allocation of Australian aid. 
3. Who receives Australian aid? 
Data on bilateral flows of ODA in constant US dollars at 2008 prices as reported 
by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC) has been used for 
the analysis that follows.5  Australia as of 2009, the most recent period for which 
ODA data is available, provided US$2.9 billion dollars (approximately 2 percent) 
of total (net) ODA of $124 billion provided by DAC membership as a group.  Of 
the Australian total, $2.4 billion (i.e. 83 percent) was distributed on a bilateral 
                                                 
4  The search for causes of economic growth and recipes for development has produced a large 
and growing literature on the theory of economic growth and the role aid and other supporting 
policies have in economic development – see Papanek, G. (1972). "The effect of aid and other 
resource transfers on savings and growth in less developed countries." The Economic Journal 
82(327): 934-950.   
5“Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and 
multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or 
by  their  executive  agencies,  each  transaction  of  which  meets  the  following  tests:  i)  it  is 
administered  with  the  promotion  of  the  economic  development  and  welfare  of  developing 
countries as its main objective; and ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element 
of at least 25 per cent.” (DAC (online)) 
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basis  to  114  of  a  total  of  155  developing  countries  listed  by  DAC  as  having 
received aid.  Amongst them, Indonesia was the largest recipient, accounting for 
a total of $361 million and Papua New Guinea with total receipts of $318 million 
came  second.    The  58  nations  in  Africa  together  received  a  total  of  US$102 
million from Australia; 25 received nothing.  Amongst the non-recipients were 
several  poor  nations  including  Angola,  Burkina  Faso,  and  African  Central 
Republic.6   
Receipts of bilateral aid from Australia vary form year to year.  I raq, as one 
example, received a total of $333 million in 2006, $40 million more than Papua 
New Guinea and $42 million more than Indonesia.  Australian ODA to Iraq has 
fallen  since:  to  $315  million  in  2007,  $270  in  2008,  and  $55  in  2009.  
Consequently, five-year average to 2009 (inclusive of endpoints) is used for ODA 
figures used henceforth.  Table 1 lists the top ten and the bottom five recipients 
of  Australia  ODA  on  this  averaged  measure.    Indonesia  ranks  first,  having 
received US$312 million as shown in  the second column.  This amounts to 13 
percent of total Australian ODA (shown in column 3) and 34 percent of the total 
ODA receipts of US$924 million (shown in column 4) for the nation.  Note that 
Papua  New  Guinea  gets  all  of  its  (net)  ODA  from  Australia  w hile  the 
corresponding figure for the Solomon Islands is 84 percent.  Eritrea, with a PPP -
per capita income of US$668 and an average life expectancy at birth for 2005 at 
52 years, ranks last with a net negative of US$0.28 million.7 
Receipts of per capita Australian ODA vary considerably across recipients.  On 
this measure, a Solomon Islander received $393 (ranked top) while his fellow 
islander from Tuvalu came second at $385.  Papua New Guinea with per capita 
receipts of $49 ranks 8th while Indonesia with a per capita receipt of $1.42 ranks 
20th.  We next explore reasons for receiving Australian aid. 
 
                                                 
6 DAC (online) database shows missing observations for these nations. 
7 This was made up of a one-off -$0.91 for 2006. 6 
 
4. Aid allocation – model and empirics 
Our objective is to explain reasons for aid receipts from Australia.  We will infer 
this from the allocation of aid by the Australian government who we treat as a 
single rational agent that maximises a generalised constant return to scale Cobb-
Douglas utility function of the form: 
    ∏   
   
         (1),8 
subject to the budget constraint 
∑           
         (2). 
That  is,  the  government  allocates  a  fixed  aid  budget  (given  as  equation  2)  to 
attributes, aiA, with elasticity i  
Maximising equation (1) subject to the budget constraint in equation (2) gives: 
                 (3). 
Equation (3) shows that the government allocates a fixed share of its aid budget 
to the attribute ‘i' valued at pi.   
However, the donor is unable to pay directly for attributes as shown in equation 
(3).    Instead,  ODA  is  channelled  through  individual  recipient  sovereigns 
depending on the composition of their attributes vis-à-vis those valued by the 
donor.  Thus, recipient ‘r’, indexed from 1 to R, receives zr of ODA on the basis of 
its attributes, aiA, weighted by the value the donor places on each attribute.  
Assuming a passive recipient and summing over her attributes, total receipts of 
ODA is given as,  
     ∑       
 
                     (4).  
                                                 
8 This generalised Cobb-Douglas utility function implies that the elasticity of substitution 
between attributes is unity. 7 
 
Stacking zr from equation (4) for the R recipients gives the receipts of ODA from 
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In the case of the deterministic relationship shown in equation (5), the vector of 
priorities  (prices)  placed  by  the  donor  on  the  n-attributes  can  be  recovered 
through pre-multiplying equation (5) by the inverse of A.  However, when only a 
subset  of  attributes  is  captured  in  matrix  A,  and  with  least  a  few  of  these 
measured  imperfectly,  then  the  empirical  implementation  of  equation  (5) 
involves the estimation of the stochastic form: 
Z = A  +                                        (5a). 
The parameter  can be recovered from a hedonic regression equation (Griliches 
1971).    The  estimate  of    reveals  the  priorities  placed  by  the  donor  on  the 
individual attributes as depicted in equation (3) above. 
The baseline model for the quantum of aid recipient ‘r’ receives from Australia, 
the donor in this case, is modelled as a log-linear function of initial income (y0), 
distance of the capital of the recipient from Canberra, a vector of policies of the 
recipient, and a set of control variables (X) as shown in equation (6) below.   
                    (    )                                           
         
(6). 
The choice of the independent variables are rationalised as follows: (i) per capita 
income captures the poverty focus of aid (Dollar and Kraay 2002); (ii) distance 
proxies  for  the  intensity  of  cultural  (North  1989),  commercial  (Frankel  and 
Romer 1999), and colonial connections with the donor (Acemoglu, Johnson et al. 
2001);  and,  (iii)  variables  denoting  the  policies  of  the  recipient  captures  the 
hypothesis of aid being provided to recipients with ‘good’ policies (Burnside and 
Dollar 2000).  A value of 1< 0 and 2< 0 would imply that, ceteris paribus, lower 8 
 
per capita income and proximity are associated with higher receipts of ODA.  
Since the level of poverty is positively correlated with per capita income, the 
former also implies a poverty-focus of bilateral ODA.  Similarly, 3 > 0 would lend 
support to the proposition that aid is provided to recipients with ‘good’ policies. 
This  specification  in  equation  (6)  follows  that  of  Alesina  and  Dollar  (2000) 
except  that  it includes distance as a new explanatory variable.   Amongst  the 
control  variables  are:  (i)  population  and  population  squared  which  together 
capture scale effects of ODA; and, (ii) per-capita income squared which captures 
notions of income convergence (Dowrick and Nguyen 1989).  Equation (6) is 
augmented  to  include  variables  that  capture  ‘national  interest’  as  per  the 
objectives of Australian aid.  This includes a test for a US-Australia and a UK-
Australia alliance in providing bilateral aid– thus measures of ODA flows from 
the United Kingdom and the USA is included in the final model.  Variable names 
and sources of data used are provided in Appendix Table A1. 
A  number  of  econometric  issues  are  considered  prior  to  the  estimation  of 
equation  (6).    The  model  is  estimated  using cross-country  data  expressed  in 
levels.  The advantage of estimating equation (6) in levels is that it exploits the 
large cross-country variation in the levels of income, aid receipts, and population 
to estimate the parameters of interest ().  The disadvantage of cross-sectional 
analysis of this nature is the risk of having omitted a relevant variable from the 
model.    The  above  can  be  addressed  by  running  the  same  regression  in 
differenced form (drawing on time series data) but this approach, while washing 
out all time-invariant country-specific effects, relies on sufficient within country 
variation of the variables included in the model.  The lack of such variation in 
most of the explanatory variables and the consequent low signal to noise ratio in 
the  differenced  data  has  favoured  the  use  of  cross-sectional  approach  to 
estimating equation (6).  Furthermore, and econometric issues aside, a change in 
the  utility  function  or  the  weightings  placed  by  the  donor  on  the  individual 
attributes over time – plausible following the end of the Cold War in 1991 and 
the commencement of the ‘War on Terror’ in 2001 – will tax degrees of freedom 
when  equation  (6)  is  estimated  using  time-series  data.    There  is  also  the 
possibility of a feedback between the level of ODA provided and several of the 9 
 
independent  variables.    Thus,  initial  year  values  are  taken  for  income, 
population,  and  the  various  measure  of  policy  to  alley  concerns  regarding 
reverse causation. Physical distance, in contrast, is exogenous.   
4.1. Data 
Table  2  provides  summary  statistics  on  the  key  variables  used  to  estimate 
equation 1.  Australia provided bilateral aid to 114 recipients, with a mean of 
US$15.19 and a median of US$0.45, the distribution is skewed to the right.  The 
average per capita income of the 136 recipients (in PPP dollars at 2008 prices) 
was $5,117 with a minimum of $185 (for Zimbabwe) and a maximum of $24,770 
(for Equatorial Guinea).  
Equation 6 is estimated following the transformation of the levels of ODA, per 
capita income, distance from Canberra, and population into natural logarithms. 
Since net ODA is negative for some recipients, 44 were added to ODA figures for 
Australia, UK, and the USA to make all ODA figures positive.  Several measures of 
policy (and quality of institutions) were used.  In the main, the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores produced by the World Bank have 
been  used  to  proxy  for  policy.    The  index  was  produced  to  assess  the 
conduciveness of the policies of a nation for economic growth, poverty reduction, 
and effective use of development assistance.  It ranges from 1 (being the lowest 
possible score) to 6 (the highest).  The World Bank produces a total of 16 CPIA 
scores, but for only 75 of the 155 countries listed by DAC as having received 
ODA.    Five  individual  measures  of  the  16  –  those  for  quality  of  debt  policy, 
budgetary  and  financial  management,  financial  sector  regulation,  human 
resource management, and macroeconomic management have been averaged to 
a CPIA average score for the 75 recipients that have this data.  The quality of 
institutions is captured with data on ‘Voice and Accountability’, ‘Political stability 
and absence of violence’, ‘Government effectiveness’, ‘Regulatory quality’, ‘Rule 
of law’, and ‘Control of corruption’ (values range from 2.5, the highest, to -2.5, the 
lowest)  from  the  World  Bank’s  World  Governance  Indicators  database 
(Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2008).  Indices of civil and political rights (scored from 1 
being the most free to 7 as the least free) from Freedom House has been used.  10 
 
The values for 2005, the initial year for the average data on ODA, are taken for 
measures  of  poverty,  population,  and  quality  of  policies  of  the  recipients.  
Distance from Canberra to the capital city is the great circle distance.   
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for the key independent variables.  The 
simple correlation between the natural logarithms of the value of Australian aid 
(lnodaaus) and that for initial income (lny0) is 0.0993 while that with distance 
from Canberra (lndist) is -0.71.  The scatter plots between  lnoda with lny0 is 
shown in Figure 1 and confirms the absence of a clear pattern on the quantum of 
bilateral aid provided by Australia with per capita income of the recipient.  The 
partial  correlation  between  ODA  and  the  rest  of  the  explanatory  variables  is 
investigated next. 
4.2. Results 
Table 4 presents estimates form four regression models, each based on different 
permutations of explanatory variables in equation 6.  The dependent variable in 
each is the natural logarithm of bilateral aid provided by Australia.  I assume that 
all of the explanatory variables are exogenous with respect to the level of ODA 
provided by Australia.  Model 1 has the average CPIA score as a measure of 
policy.  Model 2 adds measures for voice and accountability, civil rights, and 
government effectiveness to the variables included in model 1.  Model 3 adds on 
the levels of bilateral aid provided by the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America to the variables included in Model 2 and drops measures of voice and 
accountability given its high (-0.94) correlation with the measure of civil rights 
(see table 3).  Model 4 drops CPIA score from Model 3 and adds in a dummy for 
being a pacific island.  This is done to test if the island states of the pacific receive 
favourable treatment in the allocation of Australian bilateral aid.  Many more 
permutations of the set of explanatory variables for which we have data were 
experimented  with.    This  was  done  to  test  the  robustness  of  the  findings 
reported next.  Also, the natural logarithm of bilateral aid net of humanitarian 
assistance was experimented with as an  alternative dependent variable.  The 
results are reported next. 11 
 
Reading  across  Table  4,  the  variables  with  parameters  that  are  statistically 
significantly different from zero at 10 percent or less are: the constant, natural 
logarithm  of  distance  from  Canberra  of  the  capital  of  the  recipient  nation, 
measures of government effectiveness, and the natural logarithm of aid provided 
by the United States of America.  Note that distance from Canberra of the capital 
city of the recipient is a significant determinant of the quantum of Australian 
bilateral aid received.  All else equal, a recipient located twice the distance from 
Canberra as that between Manila and Honiara receives 56 percent (=0.82*ln2) 
less  Australian  bilateral  aid  relative  to  the  nearer  partner.    The  inclusion  of 
distance is new as all published studies on allocation of bilateral aid have not 
factored  this  into  their  models.    Government  effectiveness  is  statistically 
significant determinant (at 10 percent level in Model 3 and 5 percent level in 
Model 4) of the quantum of aid received, but it has the ‘wrong’ sign.9  That is, 
greater government effectiveness (all else equal) is associated with receipts of 
less Australian bilateral aid.  Models 3 and 4 show that Australian bilateral aid is 
positively linked to the level of bilateral  assistance received from the United 
States.  Evidence in support  of the proposition  that  the island nations of the 
Pacific  receive  a  disproportionate  share  of  Australian  aid  is  lacking.    This  is 
shown by the statistically insignificant coefficient of the Pacific Island dummy.   
We now turn to variables that have parameter estimates that are statistically 
insignificantly different from zero.  Their inclusion  in the estimates has been 
driven by the espoused motivations for provision of aid and their use in similar 
studies reported in the literature.  The coefficient on the natural logarithm of per 
capita income is negative in models 1 and 2 (i.e. has the ‘right’ sign) and positive 
(i.e. has the ‘wrong’ sign in models 3 and 4).  Being indifferent from zero implies 
that  there  is  insufficient  evidence  of  a  poverty  focus  in  the  allocation  of 
Australian bilateral assistance.  Similarly, the coefficient on the natural logarithm 
of population is positive (i.e. has the ‘right’ sign) in all but model 4.  The fact that 
this parameter is statistically indifferent from zero implies that population does 
not count in the allocation of Australian aid.  This particular finding raises doubts 
                                                 
9 The lone exception on the use of distance in modelling aid allocation is Batten, A. (2010). Essays 
on Aid Effectiveness in the Fragile States of the South Pacific, the Australian National University. 12 
 
on the usefulness of comparisons made between recipients on the basis of per-
capita ODA receipts. 
The  number  of  observations  used  for  the  estimates  in  models  1  and  2  was 
constrained by availability of data on CPIA.  Non- members of the World Bank do 
not have data on income, and measures of governance thus reducing the sample 
size for estimates for models 3 and 4.  Models 1 and 2, nonetheless, are able to 
account  for  64  percent  of  the  variation  in  the  data  while  the  corresponding 
figures for models 3 and 4 are 54 percent and 53 percent, respectively.  Given the 
problems with hetroscedasticity (shown in figure 1a and confirmed by Breusch-
Pagan test), heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported.   
Australia provides aid to 114 of the 155 recipients reported by DAC.  We next 
restrict our analysis to those nations who received a strictly positive amount of 
bilateral  aid  from  Australia.    Let  the  decision  to  provide  aid  by  Australia 
comprise of two sequenced steps: namely, (i) selection of nations to be provided 
bilateral  assistance;  and,  (ii)  the  value  of  assistance  to  be  assessed  for  the 
selected group.  The latter decision is assumed to be based on the attributes of 
the  selected  recipients  as  depicted  in  equation  (5).    Table  5  reports  Tobit 
estimates with explanatory variables mirroring those in Table 4.  The parameter 
estimates  reported  in  Table  5  are  conditional  on  the  recipient  already  being 
selected.10  Once again, the constant term, distance from Canberra, and the 
quantum  of  aid  received  from  the  USA  are  significant  in  determining  the 
quantum of aid received from Australia.  Additional to the above, population size, 
population  squared,  the  level  of  per  capita  income,  and  per -capita  income 
squared have parameter estimates that are statistically significantly different 
from zero at five percent level or less in models 7 and 8.  The parameter 
estimates on population and population -squared terms have the ‘wrong’ sign; 
that  is,  larger  populations  is  associated  with  receipt  of  less  aid!    The  above 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, Australian bilateral assistance is biased towards 
recipients  with  small  populations.    The  parameter  estimates  on  per  capita 
income and per-capita income squared is evidence of a poverty focus of aid.  
                                                 
10 Parameter estimates from tables 4 and 5 are not directly comparable (see Wooldridge, J. M. 
(2009). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach, South-Western Pub.)   13 
 
Taking point estimates from Model 8, all else equal, a recipient with half the per 
capita income of its counterpart receives 3 times the aid of its counterpart.  And 
the level of aid falls to zero at a per capita PPP income at 2005 prices of $5,772.  
Finally,  the  parameter  estimate  on  the  Pacific  Island  dummy  suggests  that, 
ceteris paribus, the pacific island nations are ‘under-aided’. 
The models estimated thus far were to impute the values attached by Australia 
to particular attributes of the recipients.  Parameter estimates have been used to 
assess the importance placed on poverty, policies, and physical proximity of the 
recipient  nations  to  Australia.    The  robustness  of  the  conclusions  on  the 
importance of the above-mentioned and that of a positive association between 
the amount of aid given by Australia with that by the USA (and not UK) was 
tested through estimation of several more models with different permutations of 
the  explanatory  variables.    These  conclusions  were  also  examined  with  the 
dependent variable being the value of non-humanitarian  assistance.  We also 
used life expectancy and the rate of infant mortality (one at a time) for per capita 
income in the models.  The qualitative conclusions on the statistical significance 
of the variables noted above in the allocation of Australian  aid are robust  to 
these  changes.    As  an  example,  Model  3  was  augmented  with  measures  on 
‘control  of  corruption’  with  the  estimate  for  this  variable  being  statistically 
insignificantly different from zero.  Finally, the significance of physical distance 
between the capitals of the donor and the recipient in the allocation of bilateral 
assistance  was  examined  for  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  of 
America.  Distance is found to significant at the ten percent level for the USA 
only.  The results are reported in appendix Table A2.   
5. Conclusions 
The title of the paper asks as to who receives Australian aid and why.  The first 
question is easily answered.  Data from the Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD shows that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea consistently rank high 
in terms of total receipts of Australian bilateral assistance.  Iraq and Solomon 
Islands have also featured as large recipients of Australian aid over the past five 
years.    The  ranking  in  terms  of  per  capita  receipts  of  Australian  aid  is  very 14 
 
different.  Solomon Islands and Tuvalu rank first and second on this measure, but 
as explained next – ranking on per capita receipts of aid is problematic on two 
counts.  First, the size of the population of the recipient nation does not feature 
as a significant determinant of the quantum of aid provided by Australia.  Second, 
bilateral aid is exchanged between governments where governments of small 
populations are not treated as differently as the difference in the size of their 
populations. 
Figuring  out  why  nations  receive  what  they  do  from  Australia  in  bilateral 
assistance is more complicated.  We begin by surveying the espoused reasons for 
provision  of  Australian  aid.    The  Australian  Agency  for  International 
Development states that the objective of Australian aid is: “to assist developing 
countries  reduce  poverty  and  achieve  sustainable  development,  in  line  with 
Australia's national interest”.  The above is used to formulate a utility function 
for  the government.   Maximising  this  utility function  subject  to  a  given  ODA 
budget gives clear predictions on the value attached by the donor to individual 
attributes of the recipient.  Data on bilateral aid and that on the attributes of the 
recipient is used to recover the implicit priorities of the donor through a hedonic 
regression.   
The espoused reasons for provision of bilateral aid by Australia are reconciled 
with  the  revealed  priorities  from  the  regression  estimates.    The  parameter 
estimates show that physical proximity to Canberra and the quantum of bilateral 
assistance received from the United States of America are significant factors in 
the allocation of Australian bilateral aid.   
Estimates  using  the  full  population  of  aid  recipients  from  the  OECD  shows 
poverty to be a statistically insignificant (at the ten percent level) determinant of 
the amount of bilateral aid received from Australia.  However, when the sample 
is restricted to those nations that do receive strictly positive sums of aid from 
Australia, then poverty is revealed to be significant.  The above suggests that 
Australia first selects recipient nations for assistance and then targets poverty 
within this predetermined group.  And while the Pacific island nations fall within 
this predetermined group, they are not over-aided.   15 
 
6. Annex 
Table 1: Recipients of Australian aid (ODA), average values for 2005 to 09, 
top ten and bottom 5. 
Country name  Amount (US$ 




Australian ODA as 
percent of total 
receipts 
Indonesia  312  14  34 
Papua New 
Guinea  304  13  100 
Iraq  201  9  2 
Solomon Islands  186  8  84 
Philippines  72  3  18 
Afghanistan  68  3  2 
Viet Nam  67  3  4 
Timor-Leste  66  3  31 
China  40  2  3 
Cambodia  39  2  9 
…  …  …  … 
Grenada  0.01  0.004  0.11 
Dominica  0.01  0.004  0.30 
Cote d’Ivore  0.01  0.004  0.002 
Albania  0.01  0.004  0.004 
Eriteria  -0.28  -0.01  -0.02 
Source: DAC (online) database 
Table 2: Summary statistics for key variables of equation 6 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
odaaus  114  15.19  48.63  -0.28  311.99 
odauk  140  41.49  130.59  -43.46  1246.37 
odausa  146  122.37  468.07  -15.02  5218.45 
popl05  145  36.10  143.00  0.01  1300.00 
income05a  136  5117  4942  185  24770 
distaus  151  12326  3794  2717  17807 
cpiaav  75  3.39  0.56  1.80  4.50 





Table 3: Correlation between independent variables used to estimate 
model 2 
  lnodaaus  lny0  lndist  cpiaav  vna05  civr05  ge05  lnpop0 
lnodaaus  1               
lny0  0.0993  1             
lndist  -0.7105 
-
0.1092  1           
cpiaav  0.0623  0.4697 
-
0.0178  1         
vna05  0.0431  0.5657 
-
0.1275  0.5673  1       
civr05  -0.042 
-
0.5289  0.1323  -0.522  -0.938  1     
ge05  -0.0234  0.669 
-
0.0634  0.6749  0.7355  -0.67  1   
lnpop0  0.1373 
-
0.4612  0.2016  0.0497 
-
0.4542  0.476 
-
0.4539  1 

















Table 4. Explaining Australian bilateral aid, dependent variable: log of 
bilateral aid (average of 2005 to 2009) – OLS estimates 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 




























   
Voice & 
Accountability 
  0.016 
(0.17) 
   




































LN(ODA from UK)      0.044 
(0.036) 
 




Pacific Island        -0.52 
(0.35) 
         
No. of obs.  57  57  93  96 
R2  0.64  0.64  0.54  0.53 
         
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors given in parenthesis; ***, **, * denote 
significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  18 
 
Table 5. Explaining Australian bilateral aid, dependent variable: log of 
bilateral aid (average of 2005 to 2009) – Tobit estimates 
Variable  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 




























   
Voice & 
Accountability 
  0.63 
(0.89) 
   




































LN(ODA from UK)      0.26 
(0.31) 
 




Pacific Island        -2.07* 
(1.08) 
         
No. of observations  75  75  127  134 
No. of uncensored 
obs. 
57  57  93  96 
pseudo-R2  0.084  0.098  0.105  0.108 








Note: Tobit estimates with left-censored observations only. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 




Table A1: Variable code and data sources 
Name  Code  Description and data source 
Australian aid  odaaus  Australian net disbursement of ODA, constant 2008 
US$ million (DAC Table 2a) – average flows from 
2005-08. 
Distance  distance  From Canberra to capital of recipient in kms 
(http://www.chemical-
ecology.net/java/capitals.htm) 




odauk  UK’s net disbursement of ODA, constant 2008 US$ 




odausa  USA’s net disbursement of ODA, constant 2008 US$ 
million (DAC Table 2a) - – average flows from 
2005-08. 
Income  income  Real (PPP at 2005 prices) per capita income in 
2005 from WDI 
CPIA1 
cpia1 




Quality of budgetary and financial management 
(2005) 
CPIA3  cpia3  Financial sector 
CPIA4  cpia4  Building human resources 
CPIA5  cpia5  Macroeconomic management 
Civil rights  cvlr  Civil Rights index (2005) from Freedom House (1 = 
Highest, 7 = Lowest) 
Political rights  polr  Political Rights index (2005) from Freedom House 
Infant mortality  imr  Infant mortality rate, 2005 from WDI 









Table A2. Explaining UK and US bilateral aid, dependent variable: Log of 
bilateral non-humanitarian aid (average of 2003 to 2009) 
Variable  UK  USA 










































     
No. of obs.  72  75 
Adjusted R2  0.65  0.53 
Note: Standard errors given in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively;  







Table A3: Correlation between bilateral aid given by Australia, United 
Kingdom, and the USA 
  odaaus  odauk  odausa 
odaaus  1     
odauk  0.107547  1   
odausa  0.352987  0.404908  1 
odatot  0.368966  0.653168  0.931329 
 
Table A4: Correlation between CPIA scores 
  CPIA1  CPIA2  CPIA3  CPIA4 
CPIA1  1.00       
CPIA2  0.66  1.00     
CPIA3  0.44  0.61  1.00   
CPIA4  0.54  0.52  0.53  1.00 
CPIA5  0.63  0.70  0.48  0.51 
 
Table A5: Correlation between indices of freedom with income, infant 
mortality, and life expectancy 
  polr  civlr  imr  life  
polr  1.00       
civlr  0.93  1.00     
imr  0.28  0.33  1.00   
life   -0.23  -0.27  -0.90  1.00 










Figure 1: Australian ODA plotted against Income 
 
Plots produced with STATA 
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Figure 1a: Diagnostic plots for Model 4 
 
Plots produced using R-package (Team 2008) 24 
 
Table A6: Per capita receipts of ODA for 2007, ranked from highest 
receipts. 
 

















1  Mayotte  na  na  2189  186000 
2  Palau  8148  na  1108  20162 
3  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  2300  3148  1043  110123 
4  Marshall Islands  2589  na  894  58316 
5 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  5084  9045  604  109005 
6  Solomon Islands  1177  2471  494  498240 
7  West Bank and Gaza  na  na  489  3832185 
8  Turks and Caicos Islands  na  na  475  32413 
9  Cape Verde  2707  3320  336  491717 
10  Iraq  1903  3171  307  29947491 
11  Tonga  2960  4299  299  103066 
12  Suriname  4749  7007  296  510366 
13  Kiribati  1345  2476  284  95068 
14  Dominica  4731  8479  267  72793 
15  Timor-Leste  374  721  261  1064141 
16  Vanuatu  2388  4093  249  228009 
17  Lebanon  6020  10798  230  4162450 
18  Sao Tome and Principe  920  1656  228  157637 
19  Grenada  5916  8685  223  103169 
20  Samoa  2756  4305  209  178948 
21  Liberia  203  374  193  3627285 
22  Montenegro  5909  12408  170  620941 
23  Guyana  1407  2930  167  764100 
24  Nicaragua  1004  2592  150  5595052 
25  Afghanistan  345  938  140  28259973 
26  Djibouti  1016  2097  135  834291 
27  Bhutan  1809  4536  133  676040 
28  Maldives  3506  5301  124  300718 
29  Bosnia and Herzegovina  4030  7895  120  3778410 
30  St. Lucia  5690  9819  115  168338 
31  Armenia  2996  5619  114  3072450 
32  Serbia  5336  10198  114  7381579 
33  Mauritania  842  1933  109  3138922 
34  Namibia  4216  6246  104  2088671 25 
 
35  Seychelles  12069  21463  103  85032 
36  Cameroon  1109  2131  102  18659938 
37  Sierra Leone  307  750  101  5420400 
38  Albania  3459  7310  98  3132458 
39  Macedonia, FYR  3883  9500  98  2039838 
40  Jordan  3130  5169  93  5675000 
41  Mongolia  1505  3260  91  2611453 
42  Georgia  2318  4709  87  4357857 
43  Antigua and Barbuda  13491  20324  86  85641 
44  Mali  576  1102  82  12408824 
45  Mozambique  367  792  81  21869362 
46  Zambia  937  1296  81  12313942 
47  Guinea-Bissau  449  1019  79  1541040 
48  Rwanda  361  936  76  9454534 
49  Moldova  1231  2738  73  3667469 
50  Senegal  953  1758  73  11893335 
51  Haiti  614  1110  72  9720086 
52  Comoros  740  1170  71  628410 
53  St. Kitts and Nevis  10519  14880  71  48790 
54  Belize  4099  6628  70  311500 
55  Barbados  13393  na  69  254543 
56  Tanzania  420  1229  68  41276209 
57  Burkina Faso  460  1134  65  14721434 
58  Honduras  1727  3801  65  7174129 
59  Lao PDR  704  1988  65  6092332 
60  Lesotho  776  1374  63  2031676 
61  Burundi  125  372  61  7837981 
62  Fiji  4030  4573  61  838699 
63  Benin  661  1427  57  8393132 
64  Botswana  6545  13460  57  1892426 
65  Uganda  388  1083  57  30637544 
66 
Middle East & North Africa 
(developing only)  2822  6560  56  3.19E+08 
67  Mauritius  5966  11733  55  1260692 
68  Kyrgyz Republic  726  2029  52  5234800 
69  Sudan  1151  2006  52  40432296 
70  Malawi  248  745  51  14439496 
71  Papua New Guinea  985  2080  51  6422574 
72  Bolivia  1378  4045  50  9524495 
73  Ghana  1077  1383  50  22870966 
74  Equatorial Guinea  19582  30837  49  642210 
75  Madagascar  395  995  48  18604365 
76  Cambodia  583  1833  47  14323842 
77  Gambia, The  403  1305  45  1615510 
78  Sub-Saharan Africa  1086  1982  45  8E+08 26 
 
(developing only) 
79  Somalia  na  na  44  8732569 
80  Swaziland  2562  4814  44  1151399 
81  Central African Republic  402  729  42  4257403 
82  Low income  432  1047  40  8.1E+08 
83  Niger  300  640  38  14139684 
84  Zimbabwe  na  na  38  12449219 
85  Croatia  13201  18469  37  4436000 
86  Gabon  8138  14309  36  1421882 
87  Kenya  720  1543  35  37754701 
88  Chad  660  1357  34  10622922 
89  Guatemala  2555  4627  34  13353769 
90  Morocco  2373  4033  34  31224136 
91  Congo, Rep.  2350  3752  33  3551105 
92  Eritrea  287  639  33  4781169 
93  Ethiopia  244  792  33  78646128 
94  Tajikistan  552  1771  33  6727377 
95  Sri Lanka  1617  4280  31  20010000 
96  Tunisia  3483  7584  31  10225400 
97  Vietnam  804  2621  29  85154900 
98  Azerbaijan  3851  7897  26  8581300 
99  Guinea  438  1017  24  9615073 
100  Nepal  364  1053  22  28286728 
101  Congo, Dem. Rep.  160  300  20  62522787 
102  Low & middle income  2590  5069  19  5.52E+09 
103  Togo  397  830  19  6300495 
104  Paraguay  1995  4466  18  6126643 
105  South Africa  5933  10003  17  48257282 
106  Colombia  4675  8633  16  44359445 
107  Ecuador  3432  7607  16  13341817 
108  Trinidad and Tobago  15808  25185  16  1328216 
109  World  8434  10256  16  6.62E+09 
110  Angola  3376  5206  14  17554585 
111  Egypt, Arab Rep.  1630  5085  14  80060540 
112  El Salvador  3337  6566  14  6106761 
113 
Europe & Central Asia 
(developing only)  6651  11876  14  4.02E+08 
114  Pakistan  881  2508  14  1.63E+08 
115  Costa Rica  5891  10943  13  4458782 
116  Dominican Republic  4210  7722  13  9813686 
117  Kazakhstan  6772  10955  13  15484200 
118  Nigeria  1123  1999  13  1.48E+08 
119  Algeria  4011  7812  12  33858168 
120 
Latin America & Caribbean 
(developing only)  6609  10186  12  5.6E+08 27 
 
121  Turkey  8865  13163  11  73003736 
122  Uruguay  7206  11529  11  3323906 
123  Yemen, Rep.  972  2358  11  22269306 
124  Bangladesh  434  1258  10  1.58E+08 
125  Jamaica  4819  7744  10  2675800 
126  Lower middle income  1848  4111  10  3.72E+09 
127  Middle income  2959  5760  10  4.71E+09 
128  Belarus  4667  11155  9  9702000 
129  Peru  3771  7734  9  28508481 
130  Ukraine  3069  6992  9  46509350 
131  Upper middle income  7160  11988  9  9.84E+08 
132  Cote d'Ivoire  984  1632  8  20122796 
133  Cuba  5230  na  8  11204438 
134  Malaysia  7028  13657  8  26555654 
135  Chile  9877  13854  7  16636135 
136  Philippines  1624  3397  7  88718185 
137  South Asia  984  2622  7  1.52E+09 
138  Turkmenistan  2544  6041  6  4977386 
139  Uzbekistan  830  2445  6  26867800 
140 
East Asia & Pacific 
(developing only)  2432  5127  5  1.92E+09 
141  Indonesia  1923  3761  4  2.25E+08 
142  Korea, Dem. Rep.  na  na  4  23727676 
143  Myanmar  na  na  4  49129445 
144  Syrian Arab Republic  2019  4403  4  20082697 
145  Argentina  6604  13355  3  39490465 
146  Libya  11639  15714  3  6168997 
147  Venezuela, RB  8252  12179  3  27483000 
148  Brazil  7185  9804  2  1.9E+08 
149  China  2651  5594  1  1.32E+09 
150  India  1096  2878  1  1.12E+09 
151  Iran, Islamic Rep.  4028  11048  1  71021039 
152  Mexico  9741  14547  1  1.05E+08 
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